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A deal for France’s Total to acquire a 10% stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project for US$2.55 billion 
was struck on 24 May during the International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg. This pro-
ject envisages the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant on the Gydan Peninsula and 
is being implemented by Novatek, Russia’s largest private natural gas producer. In December 
2017, the company launched the first production line of an LNG terminal on the Yamal Penin-
sula – the Yamal LNG project. In addition to this, Gazprom and Rosneft have confirmed their 
intention to implement their own LNG projects. 
The balance of the actions taken so far suggests that at present Novatek is the only Russian 
company to successfully implement new LNG projects in Russia. Apart from the LNG terminal 
operating since 2009 on Sakhalin Island (Sakhalin 2), other projects announced by Gazprom 
and Rosneft have not made it past the planning stage so far, and there is nothing to suggest 
that this might change in the coming years. 
The positive results of Novatek’s operation in the LNG sector are above all a consequence of 
the financial, administrative and political support it has received from the Russian government. 
It cannot be ruled out that the Arctic LNG 2 project will also be given similar preferential treat-
ment. The state has offered numerous privileges to Novatek because the company’s owners, 
especially Gennady Timchenko, have close social and business contacts with Vladimir Putin. 
Even though the Russian government has not adopted a separate strategy on the LNG sector, 
many facts indicate that political support for Novatek’s projects is motivated not only by the 
desire to increase Russia’s share in the global LNG market, but is also a means to maintain 
balance between the competing groups of interest in the Russian energy sector. The recogni-
tion of Novatek’s dominant position in the Russian liquefied natural gas sector could be used 
by the government as an argument to maintain Gazprom’s privileged position in gas exports 
via the pipeline system, while both Novatek and Rosneft have been lobbying for Gazprom’s 
export monopoly to be curbed. In turn, Rosneft might receive the government’s approval for 
further expansion in the oil sector. 
Novatek as the leader of the Russian 
LNG sector
Actions taken by Novatek prove that the com-
pany is becoming the real leader of the Russian 
LNG sector. In December 2017, the company 
launched the first production line (5.5 million 
tonnes) of the natural gas liquefaction plant as 
part of the Yamal LNG project (the project’s im-
plementation cost has reached US$27 billion). 
The next two are expected to be put into ope-
ration already in 2018, which will make it possi-
ble to reach a total production capacity of 16.5 
million tonnes. The company is also planning to 
build its fourth line with a capacity of 1 million 
tonnes by 2019. 
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In turn, the Arctic LNG 2 project, the estimated 
cost of which will reach US$25.5 billion, provi-
des for building a natural gas liquefaction plant 
with a total capacity of 19.8 million tonnes (the 
first line is planned to be put into operation in 
2023, and the third in 2026)1. Novatek is also 
engaged in a terminal construction project in 
Vysotsk, Leningrad Oblast (with a production 
capacity of 660,000 tonnes) and is planning to 
build an LNG reloading terminal in Kamchatka2. 
Furthermore, there are many facts indicating 
that the company is preparing for the imple-
mentation of its next large LNG projects; the 
deputy head of the company’s management 
board announced during a gas conference held 
in May 2018 in Amsterdam that Novatek was 
planning to produce 70 million tonnes of liqu-
efied natural gas annually by 2035. 
The large LNG projects announced by other 
Russian energy companies (see Appendix 1) – 
some of which were announced already in the 
first decade of this century – have not yet mo-
ved beyond the planning stage. Although Gaz-
prom have been conducting talks with foreign 
partners concerning the implementation of jo-
int projects over the past few years, the only ef-
fect is initial arrangements. A memorandum on 
the implementation of the Baltic LNG project 
was signed with Shell in 2017; the agreements 
concerning the construction of the third pro-
duction line as part of the Sakhalin 2 project 
(last signed in 2015) are also non-binding. Even 
1 «НОВАТЭК» и «Тоталь» становятся партнерами по 
проекту «Арктик СПГ 2», 24 May 2018, http://www.no-
vatek.ru/ru/press/releases/index.php?id_4=2443 
2 An agreement with the government of Kamchatka Krai 
was signed in October 2017. The estimated cost of the ter-
minal’s construction is US$1–1.5 billion, and its reloading 
capacity is expected to reach 20 million tonnes annually. 
The investment is planned to be finalised in 2023.  
though a so-called ‘final investment decision’ 
on the construction of the Vladivostok LNG ter-
minal was passed in February 2013, this project 
has in fact been frozen3. Gazprom is, in turn, 
implementing small projects in the liquefied 
natural gas sector, mainly in Russia. Kriogaz, 
a company controlled by Gazprombank, has 
built small LNG terminals in Pskov (an annu-
al production capacity of 23,000 tonnes) and 
Kingisepp (10,000 tonnes annually). Terminals 
in Petrozavodsk (100,000 tonnes annually), 
Kaliningrad (150,000 tonnes annually) and in 
Vysotsk port4 in Leningrad Oblast (660,000 ton-
nes annually) are under construction. Small-sca-
le terminals are built mainly for the purpose of 
ship bunkering. In addition to this, Gazprom is 
building an export terminal in Leningrad Oblast 
that will be used to export gas to Kaliningrad, 
and a regasification terminal in Kaliningrad 
Oblast5. In turn, in December 2017, it signed 
an agreement concerning the construction of 
a small regasification terminal in Republika 
Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Rosneft’s plans also remain unfulfilled. Russia’s 
largest oil company which has intensely lob-
bied to be granted the right to export gas in 
liquefied form6, has not even made investment 
3 The main reason has been Russia’s unsuccessful at-
tempts to attract foreign investors (China and Japan). 
In turn, Gazprom would find it difficult to implement 
this expensive project by itself (its estimated budget 
is around US$10 billion), taking into account both the 
sanctions (Gazprombank, on which sanctions have been 
imposed, was planned to be one of the main sources 
of funding) and other investment priorities. Apart from 
this, the project was also frozen due to the fall of gas 
prices on the Asian market, visible especially from the 
middle of 2014 to the first half of 2017. Although Gaz-
prom announced in July 2017 that the project would be 
implemented as a small-scale terminal, no details of the 
investment have been presented so far. 
4 In July 2017, a 51% stake in the project was taken over by 
Novatek. 
5 The investment finalisation deadline has been shifted 
from December 2017 to December 2018. 
6 Its lobbying efforts ended in success in November 
2013, when the act liberalising the rules of gas export 
in the section concerning LNG was adopted, de facto 
granting the export right to two entities, apart from 
Gazprom: Rosneft and Novatek. For more details, see: 
S. Kardaś, A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting 
Gazprom’s monopoly on exports, ‘OSW Commentary”, 
28 November 2013; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publik-
acje/osw-commentary/2013-11-28/a-feigned-liberalisa-
tion-russia-restricting-gazproms-monopoly
No other Russian energy companies, 
apart from Novatek, have made progress 
in the implementation of large LNG 
projects.
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decisions as regards its plans to build an export 
terminal in the Far East (the so-called Far East 
LNG) or concerning the implementation of the 
Pechora LNG project.
Given Gazprom’s investment plans in which 
the projects of building the Nord Stream 2, 
Turkish Stream and Power of Siberia gas pipeli-
nes are given top priority, the implementation 
of any large LNG project seems rather unre-
alistic. Sanctions, especially those imposed by 
the USA, are an additional problem because 
they impede the implementation of the plan 
to build the third production line of the natu-
ral gas liquefaction plant as part of the Sak-
halin 2 project announced several years ago 
(US sanctions have been imposed on the Yuzh-
no-Kirinskoye field which was to serve as the 
project’s raw material base). 
The situation with Rosneft is similar, as it has 
not been implementing its LNG project in the 
Far East not only due to other investment 
priorities (asset acquisitions on the internal 
market, projects in India, Indonesia and Ve-
nezuela) but also as a result of the restrictions 
resulting from sanctions. The Far East LNG 
project was to be implemented as a joint ven-
ture with the US company ExxonMobil which, 
however, suspended its co-operation with 
the Russian company after the introduction 
of the sanctions regime. Another problem in 
the case of Rosneft is the lack of access to 
transport infrastructure in the Far East, which 
has been the subject of long-lasting disputes 
with Gazprom.  
The privileged position of Novatek 
and the company’s costly successes 
in the LNG sector 
The close social and business links be-
tween the company’s owners and the 
Kremlin are the main reason why Nova-
tek has a privileged position in the Russian 
energy sector. This concerns above all Gen-
nady Timchenko, one of the key owners 
of the company7, who is a close friend of 
the Russian president8. During Vladimir 
Putin’s rule he has become one of the most 
influential people in the Russian energy sec-
tor; until March 2014, he co-owned the tra-
der firm Gunvor, which in the first decade of 
this century accounted for the sale of around 
40% of Russian oil on foreign markets. Stroy-
transgaz, a company controlled by Timchen-
ko, is implementing lucrative infrastructural 
investments in the energy sector (including 
the Baltic Pipeline System – 2 oil pipeline or 
Power of Siberia gas pipeline). Proof of the 
businessman’s high position in the Russian 
business elite may be found in the fact that 
he has been placed on the US sanction list 
created in connection with the Russian ag-
gression on Ukraine. 
At the same time, Novatek’s expansion in the 
LNG sector is a very high expense for the sta-
te budget. One example of this is above all 
the Yamal LNG project, the implementation 
of which – with a slight delay (the first line 
was launched one year later than planned) – 
has been possible due to the preferential con-
ditions it was offered. Firstly, for twelve years 
since the terminal launch, the consortium will 
be exempted from extraction tax (NDPI) and 
export duties. The consortium will also pay 
a preferential income tax (13.5%) by the time its 
7 Timchenko exercises his rights as the owner via the Vol-
ga Group holding which holds a 23.49% stake in No-
vatek. The largest stake in the company is held by Leonid 
Mikhelson (24.76%); the remaining shares are owned by 
Total (18.9%), Gazprom (9.99%) and small shareholders. 
8 Gennady Timchenko denies Putin links made him one 
of Russia’s top oligarchs; ‘The Guardian’, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/oligarch-timchen-
ko-denies-putin-links-us-blacklist-sanctions 
Novatek’s privileged position is a con-
sequence of the close links existing be-
tween the company’s owners and the 
Kremlin.
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total output has reached 250 billion m3 of gas, 
for a maximum of twelve years. The project 
will also be exempted from import duty and 
VAT on equipment, an unprecedented solution 
in the Russian Federation. Apart from this, No-
vatek has been exempted from paying taxes 
for twelve years to the budget of the Yamalo-
Nenets Autonomous Okrug (exemption from 
tax on real estate and movable assets located 
in the territory of the okrug which are used in 
the process of gas extraction or liquefaction). 
Secondly, the project was one of the few to 
have received support from the National Wel-
fare Fund since the imposition of the sanctions; 
it was allocated for the redemption of 15-year 
bonds issued by Yamal LNG (worth 150 billion 
roubles, i.e. around US$2.36 billion according 
to the exchange rate applicable in 2015). The 
bonds were redeemed in two instalments: 
at 75 billion roubles each in February and No-
vember 2015. Thirdly, the consortium received 
the fields that will be used to expand the pro-
ject’s raw material base from the government 
already in 2011. The total resources of the four 
production centres received: Severo-Obskoye 
and Vostochno-Tambeyskoye (both offsho-
re fields) and Utrenneye and Geofizicheskoye 
(both on the Gydan Peninsula) reach 978.6 
billion m3 of gas (confirmed resources); accor-
ding to estimates, the total resources of these 
fields are almost twice as large, reaching aro-
und 1.76 trillion m3 of gas and 640 million ton-
nes of oil and condensate. Natural gas from 
the Utrenneye and Geofizicheskoye fields will 
be supplied to Gazprom’s system, while Yamal 
LNG will receive gas from the Tambey group 
owned by Gazprom: the Severo-Tambeyskoye, 
Zapadno-Tambeyskoye and Tasiyskoye fields.
Even though representatives of the compa-
ny’s management have announced that they 
will not apply for state support for the Arctic 
LNG project, partly due to the risk of being 
included into the US sanctions, it cannot be 
ruled out that the project will receive some 
privileges. The Russian media dealing with this 
sector suggested already in spring 2017 that 
tax and customs allowances similar to those 
offered to Yamal LNG might also be applied in 
the case of this project. 
Besides, state support may turn out to be the 
necessary condition to expand the circle of 
foreign investors. Interest in participation in 
this project has been expressed by Japanese, 
Korean and Chinese firms9. However, there is 
a lot to suggest that, given the continuing US 
and European sanctions imposed on Russia, 
they expect guarantees that will minimise the 
risk of capital engagement. Chinese banks de-
cided to offer financial support to the Yamal 
LNG project after many months of negotia-
tions and political arrangements between the 
governments of Russia and China as late as 
April 2016 (Novatek assumed that it would be 
able to close the issues concerning the project 
financing model by June 2014). In turn, Japa-
nese companies have not decided – despite 
Russian proposals – to take part in the Yamal 
LNG project, and the Japanese bank JBIC gran-
ted the consortium a loan of 200 million euros 
only in December 2016 after it had been given 
guarantees by Italian and French credit agen-
cies (SACE and COFACE, respectively).
9 So far Novatek has concluded a few unbinding arrange-
ments providing for Asian companies engagement in 
Arctic LNG 2 project: in December 2016 with the Jap-
anese companies Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Marubeni; on 
1 November 2017 with the Chinese company CNPC; on 
22 June 2018 with Korean company Kogas. 
Regardless of the recent increase in No-
vatek’s activity in the LNG sector, it will be 
difficult to achieve the ambitious strate-
gic goals set by the state in this area.
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Novatek’s activity versus state strategy 
in exports…
There is much to suggest that the state sup-
ports Novatek’s projects in the hope that this 
will help it to at least in part make up for 
the backwardness as regards the implemen-
tation of the goals of the external gas strate-
gy in the LNG sector. It was indicated already 
in the General Scheme of Gas Industry De-
velopment until 2030 adopted in 2008 that 
it would be possible to produce between 15 
and 20 million tonnes of LNG in 2015, 50–60 
million tonnes in 2020, and 60–82 million 
tonnes after 202510. 
However, in practice, Novatek’s state-suppor-
ted activity may turn out to be insufficient 
to achieve the key goal, namely increasing 
Russia’s share in global LNG trade to a level 
of 100–120 million tonnes in 203511. Curren-
tly Russia’s share in the global LNG market is 
around 4%. In addition to exports effected 
as part of the Sakhalin 2 project (for deta-
iled data, see Appendix II) and supplies laun-
ched as part of the Yamal LNG project, Rus-
sian firms are present on the global market 
mainly through short- and Sakhalin 2 project 
(for detailed data, see Appendix II) and sup-
plies launched as part of the Yamal LNG pro-
ject, Russian firms are present on the global 
market mainly through short- and medium- 
10 Генеральная схема развития газовой отрасли на 
период до 2030 года; http://www.energyland.info/
files/library/112008/7579b56758481da282dd7e0a4d-
e05fd1.pdf 
11 Россия строит планы по захвату мирового рынка СПГ; 
30 May 2018, https://ru.reuters.com/article/business-
News/idRUKCN1IW0S3-ORUBS 
term contracts covering small volumes12. 
While Novatek managed to sign long-term 
contracts under which gas originating from 
the Yamal LNG project will be exported (see 
Appendix 3), no contracts have been signed in 
the case of the Arctic LNG project as yet. The 
company will likely launch negotiations to this 
effect not earlier than after 2020, but this may 
mean tough talks with potential contractors, gi-
ven the intensifying competition among expor-
ters. Therefore, it is unclear to which markets 
the gas produced as part of the project would 
be supplied. 
The growing competition from other liquefied 
natural gas producers is a serious challenge to 
Russia. Taking into account the timely launch of 
the three production lines as part of the Yamal 
LNG project, the total Russian production capa-
city in 2020 will reach around 27.5-30 million 
tonnes. For comparison, Qatar, currently the 
12 Gazprom became active in LNG trade in 2005. In the first 
four years, the total sales volume reached 1.2 million 
tonnes (around 1.7 bcm). A separate company, Gazprom 
Global LNG Limited, was established in August 2008. 
In the following years, though, this share was growing 
mainly owing to the launch of the natural gas liquefac-
tion plant as part of the Sakhalin 2 project. In the en-
suing years the total LNG sales volume in the case of 
Gazprom was low: 1-2.3 million tonnes annually (1.82 
million tonnes in 2010, where as much as 1.6 million 
tonnes was gas originating from the Sakhalin 2 project; 
2.3 million tonnes in 2011, including 0.96 million tonnes 
from the Sakhalin 2 project; around 2 million tonnes in 
2014, around half of which originated from the Sakhalin 
2 project and half was bought from the gas market via 
Gazprom Marketing & Trading Limited (GM&T), which is 
a subsidiary of Gazprom. 
Gazprom has signed new LNG supply contracts over the 
past few years. In 2012, GM&T signed a 20-year contract 
with the Indian firm Gail India under which 2.5 million 
tonnes of LNG will be supplied annually starting from 
2018–2019. Furthermore, on 27 October 2015, Gazprom 
Marketing & Trading Singapore (a subsidiary of GM&T) 
signed a 10-year contract with Pavilion Gas (a subsidiary 
of Singapore’s Pavilion Energy) envisaging the sale of 
LNG to Asian markets. This deal does not state precisely 
when the supplies will start or what their volumes will 
be in individual years. 
Rosneft’s position on the LNG market is also marginal. In 
May 2016, the company carried out its first LNG supply 
ever; gas was supplied to Egypt on the basis of a con-
tract signed by Rosneft and the Egyptian company EGAS 
on 27 August 2015. In turn, on 25 May 2018 in Saint 
Petersburg, Rosneft signed a 12-year contract with the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) covering 
annual supplies of 1.7 million tonnes.
The state also seems to be favouring 
Novatek as a means of balancing the 
interests of the various groups in the 
Russian energy sector.
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world’s largest liquefied natural gas producer, 
will be able to produce around 100 million ton-
nes of LNG annually, the USA around 77 million 
tonnes, and Australia around 83 million tonnes. 
… and on the domestic market
There is much to indicate that state support for 
Novatek in developing the LNG project is also 
aimed at balancing the influence of various in-
terest groups in the Russian energy sector. One 
of the key points of dispute is the reform of the 
Russian gas sector, including the demand to 
liquidate or limit Gazprom’s monopoly on pipeli-
ne gas exports expressed by so-called ‘indepen-
dent gas producers’ (Novatek, Rosneft). Altho-
ugh President Putin ordered the government to 
develop proposals for resolving this issue during 
a meeting of the Presidential Commission for 
Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy 
Sector and Environmental Security in June 2014, 
no variants have been presented so far. 
The recognition of Novatek’s dominant role in 
the LNG sector (one expression of which is the 
political, economic and administrative support 
for the projects implemented by the company) 
may be used by the government as an argument 
for maintaining Gazprom’s privileged position 
in pipeline gas exports. Gazprom has already 
raised the issue of the risk linked to potential 
competition on foreign markets between liqu-
efied natural gas and natural gas supplied via 
pipelines. In a special letter sent to the mini-
stry for energy in spring this year, Gazprom also 
insisted that the state should take such admi-
nistrative measures that would exclude com-
petition between Russian entities on external 
gas markets. In the case of Rosneft, which is 
also demanding curbs on Gazprom’s monopoly 
but which has not received state support for 
its own LNG projects, one benefit could be the 
government’s ‘green light’ for a further conso-
lidation of influence in the oil sector. 
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Russian LNG projects in 2005–2017
Project leader 
(stake)
Name Foreign partners 
and their stakes 
Production 
capacity
Launch 
date
Comments
In
 o
p
er
at
io
n
Gazprom
(50% plus 1 
share)
Sakhalin 2 Mitsui – 12.5% 
(Japan)
Mitsubishi – 10%
(Japan)
Shell – 27.5% minus 
1 share
(United Kingdom/
Netherlands)
10.9 million 
tonnes
February 
2009 
The third production line of the 
natural gas liquefaction plant 
as part of the Sakhalin 2 pro-
ject is expected to be put into 
operation in 2022 (full capacity 
5 million tonnes annually in 
2023), even though the final in-
vestment decision concerning 
this matter has not been made 
yet (implementation estimated 
cost: US$5-7.4 billion).
Novatek
(50,1%) 
Yamal 
LNG
Total – 20% (France) 
CNPC – 20% (China)
Silk Road Fund – 
9.9% (China)
16.5 million 
tonnes
2017  
Full capacity 
2018/2019
Novatek is planning to build 
the fourth production line with 
a capacity of 1 million tonnes 
by 2019 
In
 p
ro
g
re
ss
Novatek Arctic 
LNG 2
Total 
(France)
Target 
19.8 million 
tonnes
2023
Full capacity 
2026
Talks on attracting new part-
ners and the financing model 
are underway
Pl
an
n
ed
Gazprom Vladiv-
ostok LNG
- 2018/2019 2018
Full capacity 
2020
Frozen; the estimated initial 
project implementation cost 
was US$12 billion
Baltic LNG potentially Shell 
(Netherlands)
Target  
10-15 million 
tonnes
2021 Framework agreements with 
Shell have been signed,; the 
terminal is to be located in 
Ust-Luga, its estimated con-
struction cost is US$10 billion
Rosnieft’ Far East 
LNG
potentially 
ExxonMobil
(USA)
6,2 mln ton 2025 In planning stage; 
The project implementation 
cost was estimated at US$ 15.3 
billion 
Pechora 
LNG
- Target 4-8 mil-
lion tonnes
- Frozen
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LNG production and exports from Russia in 2009–2016 (in million tonnes)
Year Total 
exports
Exports according to directions
Japan South 
Korea 
Taiwan China Thailand Kuwait India Netherlands UK
2009 5,00 2,84 1,02 0,12 0,19 - 0,31 0,51 - -
2010 10,44 6,29 3,39 0,51 0,38 - 0,07 - - -
2011 10,49 7,18 2,82 0,18 0,24 0,06 - - - -
2012 10,92 8,31 2,17 0,06 0,38 - - - - -
2013 10,76 8,73 1,96 0,06 - - - - - -
2014 10,57 8,32 2,00 0,06 0,13 0,06 - - - -
2015 10,92 7,78 2,69 0,26 0,19 - - - - -
2016 10,84 7,38 1,92 1,29 0,26 - - - - -
2017 11.14 6.96 1.93 1.65 0.46 - - - 0.07 0,07
Author’s own calculations on the basis of data published by the World LNG Report in 2010–2017
APPENDIX 2
LNG export contracts using supplies from the Yamal LNG project 
• a 25-year contract covering supplies of 2.5 million tonnes of natural gas originating from the 
Yamal LNG project to Spain (the contractor is the Spanish company Gas Natural Fenosa; current 
name Naturgy);
• a 24-year contract covering supplies of 4 million tonnes of natural gas originating from the project 
to the French market (the contractor is the French company Total);
• a 23-year contract with Novatek Gas & Power (Novatek’s subsidiary) covering supplies 
of 2.7 million tonnes (of this, 1 million tonnes annually will be supplied to the French firm Engie);
• a 20-year contract with the Chinese firm PetroChina (a subsidiary of CNPC) covering supplies 
of 3 million tonnes of gas to China annually; 
• a 20-year contract with Gazprom Marketing & Trading Singapore covering supplies of 3 million 
tonnes of gas annually (Gazprom will use the gas for the needs of implementing the contract for 
LNG supplies to India).
APPENDIX 3
